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Abstract
We study eﬀort and risk-taking behaviour in an economy with a continuum of
principal-agent pairs where each agent exerts costly hidden eﬀort. When the industry
productivity is uncertain, agents have motivations to match the industry average ef-
fort, which results in contractual externalities. Contractual externalities have welfare
changing eﬀects when the information friction is correlated and the industry risk is
not revealed. This is because principals do not internalise the impact of their choice
on other principals’ endogenous industry risk exposure. Relative to the second best,
if the expected productivity is high, risk-averse principals over-incentivise their own
agents, triggering a rat race in eﬀort exertion, resulting in over-investment in eﬀort and
excessive exposure to industry risks relative to the second best. The opposite occurs
when the expected productivity is low.
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1 Introduction
It is important to understand the sources of industry boom and bust cycles, especially in
light of the recent episodes in the high-tech and the ﬁnance industries. In these situations, the
excited anticipation of the arrival of a “new technological era” of high productivities leads to
over-investment and excessive risk-taking in the corresponding industry. This “overheating”
in economic activities often contrasts with a subsequent crash where real investments and
risks are substantially reduced. These pro-cyclical investment and risk-taking behaviours
have signiﬁcant social and economic consequences (eg, the recent great recession).
In this paper, we study a new mechanism based on frictions in contracting to explain
pro-cyclical and potentially excessive risk-taking in the economy. In addition, our model
contributes to the contract theory literature by endogenising systemic risk creation within
a multiple principal-agent framework and provides a building block for studying excessive
risk-taking behaviour in the economy. In our model, there are many ﬁrms in an industry.
Each ﬁrm has a principal who owns a project and an agent who exerts costly hidden eﬀort.1
The return to eﬀort of all agents is aﬀected by an industry productivity shock. As a result,
the level of industry risk faced by a ﬁrm is endogenous and is increasing in its agent’s
eﬀort choice.2 Additionally, the project’s payoﬀ is subject to idiosyncratic risk. Principals
choose contracts to make risk-return trade-oﬀs that are individually optimal. However,
they do not take into account their impact on aggregate variables such as average eﬀort
in the industry. This results in contractual externalities when these aggregate variables
enter the contracting problems as benchmarks. By investigating the conditions under which
contractual externalities have welfare changing eﬀects, our paper oﬀers a new perspective on
excessive risk-taking phenomenon over the boom-bust cycle.
In our baseline model, each principal uses a contract based on both absolute and relative
performance evaluations (hereinafter APE and RPE). By using industry average as bench-
marks in RPE, principals are able to shield their agents from industry risk which is correlated
across agents but not from idiosyncratic risk. Hence, if they have to rely exclusively on RPE,
principals encourage their agents to take on industry risk which they have to shoulder en-
tirely. When it is feasible, principals would combine APE with RPE to improve risk sharing
but the optimal weight on APE might be positive or negative. When principals care mostly
1This contrasts with setups with one principal and many agents (eg, team incentives) or many principals
and one agent (eg, common agency).
2In this paper we treat the correlated industry risk and the systemic risk as the same and use the terms
interchangeably.
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about industry risk, they put positive weight on APE to expose the agent to industry risk
and control ‘excessive’ industry risk taking. When principals care mostly about idiosyncratic
risk, they put negative weight on APE to reduce agents’ idiosyncratic risk exposure.3
These results from our baseline model oﬀer a potential resolution for conﬂicting ﬁndings
in the literature on RPE. Earlier empirical work has found that executives’ compensations are
very sensitive to industry performance.4 These ﬁndings are interpreted as indirect evidence
that little RPE is observed in practice, hence challenge the existing theory (Holmstro¨m
1979; 1982) which views the industry shocks as exogenous and unrelated to eﬀort choices, and
predicts that RPE will be used to make executives’ compensations insensitive to such shocks.
However, this interpretation conﬂicts with more recent empirical studies using a new source
of data. Based on detailed disclosure data on executive compensation contracts, these studies
ﬁnd that a signiﬁcant proportion of ﬁrms use some form of RPE.5 Our results shed light on
these seemly conﬂicting ﬁndings since in our theory the sensitivity to industry risk can be
desirable which can be achieved by using a combination of RPE and APE. Furthermore,
our model makes new testable predictions on how structural economic variables aﬀect the
optimal mix of RPE and APE.
We are also able to shed light on the related empirical observation that sensitivity of
CEO compensation to industry shocks is asymmetric. CEOs are rewarded for good industry
shocks but not punished for bad ones.6 Literature has so far highlighted rent-seeking by
CEOs as an explanation for these ﬁndings. We provide an alternative explanation based on
optimal contracting. In our model, when there is a good industry shock and the expected
industry productivity is high, agents put more eﬀort resulting in more industry risks. Hence,
principals would put positive weight on APE to control industry risk taking, seemingly
rewarding the agent for industry performance. By contrast, when the expected industry
productivity is low, idiosyncratic risks become relatively more important. This results in
lower weight on AP and makes agents’ compensations less sensitive to industry risks during
downturns. In fact, our model makes the additional testable prediction that observed pro-
cyclical pay sensitivity would be more pronounced in industries where industry shocks are
3Negative weight on APE can be surprising since it reduces incentive for eﬀort provision. However, this
can be optimal when it is very costly to let the agents take on additional idiosyncratic risk (eg., when agents
are quite risk averse relative to principals or idiosyncratic shocks are very volatile). Moreover, negative
weight on APE does not mean that agents are punished for good performance. When APE and RPE are
combined, agents are always rewarded for their own performance.
4See Gibbons and Murphy (1990); Prendergast (1999); Aggarwal and Samwick (1999).
5See De Angelis and Grinstein (2010) and Gong et al. (2010).
6See Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and Garvey and Milbourn (2006).
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large and principals are more risk-averse.
Next, we study how individually optimal contracting aﬀects aggregate investment and
risk-taking behaviour and its welfare implications using the baseline model as a building
block. A key feature of our model is that the industry benchmark is endogenously deter-
mined because it is a function of the average managerial eﬀort, an equilibrium outcome.
As agents have incentives to match the industry benchmark to reduce their exposure to
the industry productivity shock, this generates a feedback loop between individual and the
industry average eﬀort among agents. This feedback loop creates an externality in setting
incentives among principals in the industry since principals take the industry benchmark as
given and do not take into account the impact of their choices on it. To study the welfare
impact of this externality we compare it with the second best where a planner maximises
the sum of the payoﬀs of all the principals in the industry. When a principal gives stronger
incentives to her agent, this leads to an increase in the industry average eﬀort which has
two eﬀects. First, through the feedback loop, eﬀorts of other agents, and hence expected
outputs of all other ﬁrms increase. Second, higher eﬀorts by other agents generate additional
industry risks which are shouldered by all other principals. Since individual principals do
not internalise their impact on other principals, relative to the second best, the ﬁrst eﬀect
leads to too little while the second eﬀect leads to too much eﬀort provision.
We ﬁnd that, in the baseline setup, where principals can use both APE and RPE to
separate their agents’ exposure to industry and idiosyncratic risks, contractual externalities
do not have welfare impact, ie., the equilibrium outcome and the planner’s solution coincide.
However, we ﬁnd that contractual externalities have welfare changing implications when
there are informational frictions restricting the principals’ ability to separate the two types
of risks. The arrival of a new technological innovation, a phenomenon that often triggers
industry boom and bust cycles is one important case. In reality absolute performances of
CEOs are often measured by their ﬁrms’ individual stock prices and the industry benchmark
corresponds to the industry stock index. The hype around the new technology often causes
a run up in all stock prices in the industry, without revealing the underlying industry pro-
ductivity, eg, the dot.com boom in 1990s. The hype washes out when comparing individual
ﬁrms’ stock prices with the industry stock index. Hence, this type of information friction
does not aﬀect RPE but makes APE a noisy contractual instrument. As a result, princi-
pals rely more heavily on RPE less on APE, creating welfare changing eﬀects of contractual
externalities.
If the expected industry productivity is high, eg, during a boom, a principal in order to
reap the high productivity beneﬁt would like to elicit high eﬀort from her agent by increasing
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incentives. Since APE is noisy, she relies more on RPE relative to the second best, which
triggers a rat race among agents to exert eﬀort and causes excessive industry risk exposure for
principals. By contrast, if the expected industry productivity is low, eg, during a recession,
the principal would like to reduce her agent’s eﬀort. Once again since APE is noisy, she
reduces RPE instead. Relative to the second best, this triggers a race to the bottom to
exert eﬀort and generates too little industry risk. In this case, the planner can improve the
total welfare by making RPE countercyclical: enforcing lower (higher) RPE during booms
(busts). The model, therefore, oﬀers some empirical predictions and policy guidance on
managerial pay. For example, it predicts that social ineﬃciency is more likely in an industry
where the industry-wide productivity is expected to be high and volatile and APE is noisy.
This is more likely to be true in emerging industries as opposed to mature ones where there
is less uncertainty about the industry productivity. Hence, it is relatively more important
to have close supervision of excessive risk-taking in emerging industries with high expected
productivities.
The mechanism described above leads to ineﬃciency in systemic but not in idiosyncratic
risk taking. We show this by letting productivity shocks to be independent across projects.
In this case, agents do not have motivation to match the industry average eﬀort since they
cannot remove their exposure to idiosyncratic productivity shocks in their compensations
by matching their peers. Hence there is no feedback loop between individual and industry
average eﬀort. This unique prediction on ineﬃcient procyclical systemic risk taking is well
supported by the data. For example, Hoberg and Phillips (2010) ﬁnd that boom-bust cycles
are more likely in industries with many ﬁrms and when the common industry productivity
shocks are volatile and diﬃcult to predict. Bhattacharyya and Purnananda (2011) have
documented between 2000 and 2006, the period of ﬁnancial industry boom, idiosyncratic
risks have dropped by almost half while systemic risks have doubled among US commercial
banks. That is, the potentially excessive risk-taking during the boom period is found to be
correlated among ﬁrms in the same industry.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we discuss the related literature.
In section 3, we present the model. In section 4, we lay out agents’, principals’ and planner’s
optimization problems. In section 5, we study the baseline case without any information
frictions. We solve for the optimal linear contract under the equilibrium and the second best
and compare the two. In sections 6 and 7, we study the case with information frictions, and
analyse the welfare impact of contractual externalities. Section 8 concludes.
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2 Related Literature
Since the results in our paper hinge on the fact that contracts put some weight on
the industry average, our paper is closely related to the literature on relative performance
(starting with Holmstro¨m 1979; 1982). We contribute to this literature theoretically in
several aspects. First we endogenize the relative benchmark by linking it with equilibrium
outcomes. Second, we study contractual externalities among multiple principal-agent pairs
and their welfare consequences. Our theoretical extension has many unique predictions
on the use of APE and RPE in compensation contracts that match well with the data as
mentioned earlier and our comparative statics produce many new testable implications.
Many contracting situations involve rivalrous agency where principals hire agents who
compete on their behalf. The literature on rivalrous agency (for example, Myerson (1982),
Vickers (1985), Freshtman and Judd (1986; 1987), Sklivas (1987), Katz (1991), among oth-
ers)) has examined the strategic aspect of incentive provision among principals to explore
implications for oligopolistic conducts. Our paper diﬀers in two aspects. First, in our mo-
del principals do not engage in direct competition and the interactions among agents arises
endogenously via contracts that are based on correlated information. Second, our focus is
diﬀerent. We explore implications of contractual externalities for aggregate ineﬃciencies.7
Our model also relates to the principal-agent literature on eﬀort and risk choice. In
our model an agent’s eﬀort choice and the riskiness of his project are tightly linked. This
is because the productivity of eﬀort is random and correlated across ﬁrms, and thus when
an agent increases his eﬀort, both the expected return and the systematic risk exposure
of the project are higher. We view this feature of the model desirable when studying ex-
cessive risk taking from a social perspective, especially considering that episodes of over
(under) investment at the industry and/or the economy level are often observed together
with excessive (insuﬃcient) risk taking. In this way our setup and conclusions are diﬀerent
from those models where agents can choose eﬀort and level of risk separately (See Diamond
(1998); Biais and Casamatta (1999); Palomino and Prat (2003); and Makarov and Plantin
(2010)). We acknowledge that in some settings agents can choose risk and return of the
projects separately, however in other settings agents have to choose a portfolio of risk and
7Our model diﬀers from the study of ‘common agency’ (Pauly (1974); Bernheim and Whinston (1986))
where multiple principals share the same agency since our principals do not share any agents. Furthermore,
this literature studies contracting when externality is given. In our model, externality arises endogenously
through contracting. Our paper is also diﬀerent from the contract theory literature on (rank order) tour-
naments (Akerlof (1976); Lazear and Rosen (1981); Green and Stokey (1983); Nalebuﬀ and Stiglitz (1983);
and Bhattacharya and Mookherjee (1986)) where they study one principal and many agents.
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return together. Put diﬀerently, agents may have to trade oﬀ investing eﬀort in high-risk-
high-return projects versus low-risk-low-return projects. By treating the risk-return as a
portfolio, our framework complements and contributes to the understanding of sub-optimal
risk-taking in the principal-agent framework. Importantly, we ﬁnd that agents in our frame-
work take suboptimal amounts of systematic rather than idiosyncratic risks since they can
oﬀset systematic risk exposures by matching the industry average eﬀort. Additionally, in
our framework sub-optimal risk taking arises due to contractual externalities as opposed to
nonlinearities in payoﬀ schedules.
The recent crisis has ignited an interest in macro and banking literature on excessive risk
taking behaviour of banks. To our best knowledge, only one other line of literature predicts
excessive undertaking of systemic risks and the prediction is one-sided about booms. This
literature studies the incentive for banks to take on excessive risk collectively anticipating
bailouts in case of ﬁnancial crisis (Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007); Acharya and Yorulmazer
(2008); Farhi and Tirole (2011); and Acharya et al. (2011)).
There is a line of ﬁnancial literature that shows career or reputational concerns can lead
to herd like behavior among agents (eg., Scharfstein and Stein (1990); Rajan (1994); Zwiebel
(1995); and Guerrieri and Kondor (2012)). For example, Rajan (1994) models the informa-
tion externality across two banks where reputational concerns and short-termism induce
banks to continue to lend to negative NPV projects. He derives a theory of expansionary (or
liberal) and contractionary (or tight) bank credit policies which inﬂuence, and are inﬂuenced
by other banks’ credit policies and conditions of borrowers. However, his model does not
examine whether banks correlate their lending to similar industries or not. Further, in his
model the short-term nature of managerial decisions drives career concern and hence expan-
sionary bank credit policies during the boom, whereas in our model it is the information
frictions on systemic productivity shocks. More broadly, the major diﬀerence between our
paper and this line of research is that we study explicit rather than implicit incentives. This
allows us to generate quite diﬀerent and unique testable predictions and policy implications;
eg, regulations on executive compensation over the business cycles.
3 Model
In this section, we describe our setup, information environment, and equilibrium deﬁni-
tion.
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3.1 The Setup
There is a continuum of principals in an industry. Each principal owns a ﬁrm which
in turn owns a project. There is also a continuum of agents who are able to obtain a ﬁxed
reservation utility in a competitive labor market. The principal hires an agent to work on the
project and oﬀers the agent a contract. Each principal, agent and project triplet is indexed
by i ∈ [0, 1]. The principal’s objective is to maximize her expected utility which is based
on the expected ﬁnal value of the project. Principals are potentially risk averse, and their
utility is given by us (w) = − exp (−rsw) where rs ≥ 0.8
There are three dates t = 0, 1, 2. At t = 0, principal i oﬀers agent i ∈ [0, 1] a contract. We
assume that contracts are oﬀered simultaneously. Agent i observes his contract and decides
whether to accept or reject it. If he accepts the contract, he chooses hidden eﬀort denoted by
ei on project i. Agent i’s eﬀort is costly and the cost is speciﬁed as C (ei) = e
2
i /2. We assume
that all agents have identical CARA preferences so that u (wi, ei) = − exp (−r (w − C (ei)))
where r ≥ 0. At t = 1, two payoﬀ-relevant public signals about project i are revealed.
One is about agent i’s performance and the other is about the average performance of all
projects in the industry. We assume that these signals are contractible and determine agent
i’s compensation. All agents are paid at time 1. At t = 2, the ﬁnal values of all projects are
realized and principals receive their payoﬀs. For simplicity we assume no discounting.
3.2 Production Technology
We assume that project i generates output Vi, which is a random function of agent i’s
unobservable eﬀort and two stochastic shocks,
Vi = V (ei, h˜, ˜i). (1)
The randomness arises from a common random variable h˜, and a project-speciﬁc random
variable ˜i. We interpret h˜ as a common productivity shock to all projects and ˜i as an
output shock speciﬁc to the individual project. In the rest of the paper, we refer to h˜ as
the industry productivity shock or the systemic shock as it cannot be diversiﬁed away. The
8Note that we allow for risk-averse principals. In presence of contractual externalities risk-neutrality of
principals is not an innocuous assumption. Later in the paper, we discuss diﬀerences in the results when
rs = 0 and rs = 0. In reality, there are a number of reasons why principals might be risk-averse or act as
if they are risk-averse. Banal-Estano˜l and Ottavinani (2006) have discussed these in detail, which include
concentrated ownership, limited hedging, managerial control, limited debt capacity and liquidity constraints,
and stochastic productions.
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important assumption is that ∂2Vi/(∂h∂ei) = 0, ie, the state of nature that is common
across agents, aﬀects the productivity of eﬀort. This speciﬁcation is meant to capture the
uncertainty about industry productivity after a technological innovation.
Our results are based on a linear speciﬁcation where Vi = h˜ei + ˜i. In our model, the
random variable h˜ is normally distributed with mean h¯ > 0 and variance σ2h (ie, precision
τh = 1/σ
2
h). The random variable ˜i is normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ
2

(ie, precision τ = 1/σ
2
 ).
9
Note that in our speciﬁcations, the productivity shock enters multiplicatively with eﬀort.
When σh = 0, the speciﬁcation for output in our model is standard. In the more general case
where σh > 0, higher average eﬀort generates a higher return, but since the productivity of
eﬀort is random it also leads to higher volatility. Here, we have in mind a broad interpretation
of eﬀort as choosing the scale of the project, eg, by devoting more resources (time, personnel,
etc.) to it.10
3.3 Information Structure
In our model principals receive contractible signals about the output of their individual
projects, and the average output of the industry. We assume that the industry average reveals
the industry productivity shock h˜ with noise. The idea is that after a major technological
innovation there is uncertainty about industry productivity and it is diﬃcult to assess the
realisation of this uncertainty through public signals such as industry stock price indices,
which themselves are very noisy.
Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst contractible signal is a noisy signal of project i’s outcome, ie, agent
i’s performance, given by
si = h˜ei + ˜i + ζ˜ , (2)
where ζ˜ is an industry-wide noise normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2ζ (ie,
precision τζ = 1/σ
2
ζ ).
9To show that the common productivity shock is a key driver for our results, in Section 6.3, we analyse
an alternative speciﬁcation where the productivity function is Vi = k˜iei + ˜i. Here k˜i is a project-speciﬁc
random term.
10Similar multiplicative function forms of productivity shocks and ﬁrm input choices have also been used
to study ﬁrm dynamics with microeconomic rigidities in the macro literature. For example, Bloom et al.
(2014) model the ﬁrm output as a triple multiplicative product of industry, idiosyncratic productivity shocks
as well as ﬁrm’s choices on capital and labor.
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The second is a noisy signal of the industry average project outcome, ie, the average
performance of all agents, given by
t = h˜e+ ζ˜ , (3)
where e =
∫ 1
0
eidi is the average eﬀort of all agents. Note that since the signals about the
projects’ outcomes are correlated, the industry average output is observed with noise ζ˜.
Hence, the industry average reveals the industry productivity h˜ with noise.
In this paper, we restrict attention to linear compensation contracts which is common in
the theoretical literature on principal-agent models. We let pi be a signal about the agent’s
performance relative to his peers given by,
pi = si − t = h˜ (ei − e) + ˜i. (4)
In a linear contracting environment any contract written on si and t can be written in
terms of si and pi, and vice versa. To provide better intuition, in the rest of the paper, we
assume that the principals write contracts on the relative performance signals rather than
the industry average signal.
3.4 Equilibrium Deﬁnition
We assume that agent i’s linear compensation contract has three components. The ﬁrst
component is a ﬁxed wage Wi and the other two components condition the agent’s payment
on the realization of the two signals. Therefore, agent i’s total compensation Ii is given by
Ii (li,mi,Wi) = lipi +misi +Wi, (5)
where li and mi are the weights on relative and absolute performance signals. Hence, li and
mi measure the relative performance evaluation (RPE) and absolute performance evaluation
(APE) components of the contract.
Now we are ready to specify agent i’s optimization problem. We assume that agents’
reservation utility is u
(
I¯
)
. Agent i accepts contract (li,mi,Wi) if his expected utility from
accepting the contract exceeds his reservation utility
E [u (Ii (li,mi,Wi)− C (ei (li,mi,Wi)))] = E [u (lipi +misi +Wi − C (ei (li,mi,Wi)))] ≥ u
(
I¯
)
,
where ei (li,mi,Wi) is the optimal eﬀort choice conditional on accepting the contract. That
is,
ei (li,mi,Wi) = argmax
ei≥0
E [u (lipi +misi +Wi − C (ei))] . (6)
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We deﬁne an equilibrium of the model as follows.
Definition 1: An equilibrium consists of contracts (l∗i ,m
∗
i ,W
∗
i ), eﬀort choices e
∗
i =
ei (l
∗
i ,m
∗
i ,W
∗
i ) for each i ∈ [0, 1] and average eﬀort e =
∫ 1
0
e∗i di such that given e, the
contract (l∗i ,m
∗
i ,W
∗
i ) solves principal i’s problem, ie, it maximizes E [us (Vi − Ii)] subject to
E [u (Ii − C (ei))] ≥ u
(
I¯
)
, where ei = ei (li,mi,Wi) (given in (6)).
To study the potential externality in the economy, we also deﬁne the second best of the
model. It is deﬁned as the solution to the planner’s problem where the planner maximises
the sum of the utilities of all principals conditional on the incentive and individual rationality
constraints for the agents. Formally,
Definition 2: A second-best solution consists of a contract
(
lSB,mSB,W SB
)
and ef-
fort choice eSB where eSB = ei
(
lSB,mSB,W SB
)
and the contract solves the planner’s
problem, ie, it maximizes
∫ 1
0
E [us (Vi − Ii)] di, subject to E [u (Ii − C (ei))] ≥ u
(
I¯
)
, where
ei = ei (l,m,W ) (given in (6)) .
Note that the planner’s role is limited to coordinating the contracts written by principals.
In particular, the planner must give agents incentives to accept the contract and exert the
desired level of eﬀort.11
We begin our analysis in section 4 by ﬁrst solving the agents’, principals’ and planner’s
problems in the contractual environment discussed above. In section 5, we study a baseline
case where τζ = ∞ where there is no information friction regarding the uncertain industry
productivity shock, h˜. In section 6, we incorporate in the model an information friction by
letting 0 ≤ τζ < ∞. In these cases, APE is not fully informative and principals rely more on
RPE as contracting instruments. We discuss how the equilibrium eﬀort level compares with
the second-best and present results on comparative statics.
4 Agents’, Principals’ and Planner’s Problem
In this section we ﬁrst solve agents’ equilibrium eﬀort choices for a given contract. We
then use this solution to characterize principals’ and the planner’s choices of optimal contract.
11The second best contract pushes agents exactly to their reservation utilities. However, it would be
misleading to think that the second-best contract favours the principals’ since given CARA utilities and
linear contracts, the solution also maximizes the total surplus.
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4.1 Agents’ Eﬀort Choice
Given contract (li,mi,Wi) agent i’s compensation is:
Ii = lipi +misi +Wi = li
(
h˜ (ei − e) + ˜i
)
+mi
(
h˜ei + ˜iζ˜
)
+Wi, (7)
and agent i chooses ei to maximize:
E
[
u
(
li
(
h˜ (ei − e) + ˜i
)
+mi
(
h˜ei + ˜i + ζ˜
)
+Wi − C (ei)
)]
. (8)
Computing the expectation in the above expression, agent i’s problem in (8) can be restated
as choosing ei to maximize:
(li +mi) h¯ei−lih¯e+Wi−C (ei)− 1
2
r
(
(li (ei − e¯) +miei)2 1
τh
+ (li +mi)
2 1
τ
+m2i
1
τζ
)
. (9)
From (9) we see how a given incentive package shapes agent i’s exposure to various sources
of risks. His risk exposure to the common productivity shock (h˜) depends on (i) the power of
the relative performance-based pay li times the diﬀerence between his eﬀort and the average
eﬀort (ei − e¯), and (ii) the power of absolute performance pay mi times his eﬀort ei. His
risk exposure to the common noise ζ˜ depends solely on the power of absolute performance-
based pay while his risk exposure to the idiosyncratic noise ˜i depends on the power of total
performance-based pay. From this we can see that by matching the average eﬀort in the
industry, agent i is able to completely hedge his exposure to the industry risk that comes
through his relative performance pay, although he might still be exposed to some industry
risk that comes through his absolute performance pay. Taking the ﬁrst-order condition and
solving for ei, we obtain agent i’s eﬀort choice as
ei =
(li +mi) h¯+
r
τh
li (li +mi) e¯
1 + r
τh
(li +mi)
2 . (10)
Note that agent i’s eﬀort is increasing in e¯, the average eﬀort exerted by all the other agents
with a positive relative performance pay sensitivity. Thus, when the average eﬀort increases,
agent i’s best response is to increase his eﬀort.
Typically, the more risk averse an agent is (ie., the higher r is) and/or the more volatile
the industry shock becomes (ie., the lower τh is), the lower eﬀort level he will choose. This
is because by lowering his eﬀort, the agent reduces his exposure to the industry risk. This
eﬀect is captured by the term r/τh in the denominator of (10). In our setup, the term r/τh
is also in the numerator capturing the fact that when r is higher or τh is lower, an agent
has a stronger incentive to match the average eﬀort to hedge the industry risk. Through
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this second eﬀect, for a given contract (li,mi), the agent’s eﬀort may increase when his risk
aversion is higher or the industry productivity shock becomes more volatile.
Crucially the total performance-based pay, (li +mi), has two opposing eﬀects on agent
i’s eﬀort choice. Increasing it makes agent i increase his eﬀort because his pay becomes more
sensitive to average productivity, h¯, and the magnitude of his performance relative to the
industry average e¯. This is captured by the numerator in (10). At the same time, increasing
(li +mi) causes agent i to bear more industry risk by making the agent deviate more from
the industry average. This increase in risk exposure induces him to lower his eﬀort. This
eﬀect is reﬂected by the denominator in (10). Moreover, both eﬀects become stronger as the
industry risk 1/τh increases. As we show later, these two eﬀects underly the externalities
that principals have to face when writing the compensation contracts. Note that in the limit,
as the industry risk approaches zero, our model delivers the standard result where agent i’s
eﬀort is determined by his performance pay and the productivity of his eﬀort, ie, (li +mi)h¯.
4.2 Principals’ Choice of Optimal Contract
Now we turn to the principals’ problem. Principal i chooses the contract terms (li,mi,Wi)
to maximize her expected utility, E [us (Vi − Ii))] subject to E [u (Ii − C (ei))] ≥ u
(
I¯
)
where
ei is given by (10).
We proceed to solve the equilibrium contract terms (li,mi,Wi). Using (7) we obtain
principal i’s ﬁnal payoﬀ as
Vi − Ii = h˜ei + ˜i − li
(
h˜ (ei − e) + ˜i
)
−mi
(
h˜ei + ˜i + ζ˜
)
−Wi.
Computing E [us (Vi − Ii))], we see that principal i chooses (li,mi,Wi) to maximize
(1− li −mi) h¯ei + lih¯e−Wi − 1
2
rs
(
(ei − li (ei − e)−miei)2 1
τh
+ (1− li −mi)2 1
τ
+m2i
1
τζ
)
(11)
where ei is given by (10). Using (9) and agent i’s individual rationality constraint we obtain
− (li +mi) h¯ei+lih¯e−Wi = −C (ei)−1
2
r
(
((li +mi) ei − lie¯)2 1
τh
+ (li +mi)
2 1
τ
+m2i
1
τζ
)
−I¯ .
We substitute the above equation into (11) to see that principal i chooses (li,mi) to maximize
h¯ei − C (ei)− 1
2
rs
(
(ei − li (ei − e)−miei)2 1
τh
+ (1− li −mi)2 1
τ
+m2i
1
τζ
)
−1
2
r
(
(li (ei − e¯) +miei)2 1
τh
+ (li +mi)
2 1
τ
+m2i
1
τζ
)
− I¯ . (12)
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The above expression has an intuitive interpretation as it is principal i’s and agent i’s
combined surplus. The ﬁrst term is the expected output of the project, the second term is
the cost of agent i’s eﬀort, and the next two terms are the disutilities from the risk exposures
of the agent and the principal respectively.
From the above expression, we see that APE and RPE play diﬀerent roles in risk sharing
between principals and agents. APE introduces agents to both industry and idiosyncratic
risks. By contrast, when agents match each other’s eﬀort choices, RPE shields agents from
industry risk, although it still exposes agents to idiosyncratic risk.
In this paper we will restrict attention to situations where the equilibrium is unique.
Next proposition guarantees the existence of a unique equilibrium as long as the industry
risk is not too large.12
Proposition 1: Given h¯, r, rs, there exists τ¯h such that for all τh > τ¯h there exists a
unique equilibrium contract which is symmetric.
Note that once the values of h¯, r, rs are ﬁxed, Proposition 1 guarantees that there is a
unique equilibrium for large enough τh regardless of the values of τ and τζ .
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4.3 Planner’s Problem
From Deﬁnition 2 we see that the planner chooses the contract terms l andm to maximize
the sum of principals’ utilities subject to incentive and participation constraints. Since prin-
cipals’ optimization problems are identical, the planner’s problem can be seen equivalently
as maximizing the utility of one of the principals taking into account that e∗i = e¯. That is,
the planner internalizes the impact of the contract terms on the industry average eﬀort level
e¯. Thus, the planner chooses (l,m) to maximize
h¯e− C (e)− 1
2
rs
(
e2 (1−m)2 1
τh
+ (1− l −m)2 1
τ
+m2
1
τζ
)
−1
2
r
(
m2e2
1
τh
+ (l +m)2
1
τ
+m2
1
τζ
)
− I¯ , (13)
where
e =
(l +m) h¯
1 + r
τh
(l +m)m
. (14)
12When the industry risk is large, it is possible to construct examples of multiple equilibria. The multi-
plicity of equilibrium contracts is an interesting possibility that is worth studying further in future work.
13This allows us to ﬁx τh and perform comparative statics with respect to τ and τζ (without losing
existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium).
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In our model, industry benchmark is a function of the industry average eﬀort. Since
agents have incentives to match the industry benchmark to reduce their exposure to the
industry productivity shock, this generates a feedback loop between individual and the in-
dustry average eﬀort of the agents. By comparing equations (12) and (13), we observe that
in the decentralised equilibrium principals do not internalise their choices of contract terms
on the industry average eﬀort while the planner does. As a result, this feedback loop cre-
ates externalities, which we term as contractual externalities, in the decentralised equilibrium
where the principals do not take into account their impact on the industry benchmark. Com-
paring the decentralised equilibrium outcome with the second best allows us to investigate
the magnitude and the direction of these contractual externalities and perform comparative
statics.
5 The Baseline Model
In this section, we study the baseline set up where τζ → ∞ and the noise ζ˜ disappears.
As we show below, in this case information friction regarding the uncertain industry shock h˜
is absent. We begin our analysis by explicitly characterising the equilibrium in this baseline
case.
Proposition 2: When τζ approaches inﬁnity, the optimal contract (l
∗,m∗,W ∗) is sym-
metric and unique. The total performance sensitivity a∗ = l∗ + m∗ is the unique positive
root to the following equation:
h¯2
(
r
τh
a+ 1
)(
r
τh
+
rs
τh
)2
(a− 1) (15)
+
(
r
τh
+
rs
τh
+
(
r
τh
)2
a2
(
rs
τh
+ 1
)
+ 2
rs
τh
r
τh
a
)2(
a
r
τ
+ (a− 1) rs
τ
)
= 0.
Given a∗ the contract term m∗ is given by:
m∗ = a∗ −
r
τh
(
1 + r
τh
(a∗)2
)
+ rs
τh
(a∗ − 1)
(
r
τh
a∗ + 1
)
(
r
τh
a∗ + 1
)(
r
τh
+ rs
τh
) . (16)
The equilibrium contract of the baseline model features both APE and RPE, although
the optimal weight on APE, m∗, might be positive or negative. Corollary 2 characterizes the
sign of APE in equilibrium.
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Corollary 1: The weight on the absolute performance signal m∗, is positive (negative,
zero) if
h¯2
rs
τh
(
rs
τh
+ 1
)
+
rs
τh
rs
τ
(
1 +
r
τh
)
+
r
τ
(
rs
τh
− r
τh
)
(17)
is positive (negative, zero).
It is interesting to note that when m∗ is strictly positive, agents are rewarded for better
industry performance. In contrast, in the single-agent relative performance model, under
corresponding assumptions, agents would not be rewarded by what seems to be luck rather
than eﬀort.14 The diﬀerence in the results is rooted in the industry risk.
We can see from the principal’s objective function in (12) that when the agents match
the average eﬀort in the industry, they do not face any industry risk through RPE. The
only industry risk they face comes from APE. In this sense, like in Holmstro¨m (1982), RPE
completely ﬁlters out the correlated risk or the luck component. At the same time, the fact
that RPE shields them from the industry risk means that the agents do not consider the
impact of their eﬀort choice on their ﬁrm’s exposure to the industry risk, potentially exposing
their principals to it excessively. Therefore, diﬀerent from the classical relative performance
literature, our model ﬁnds that principals use APE to control and share risks with agents
which RPE alone cannot achieve.
Speciﬁcally, APE plays two roles from risk-sharing perspective. First, by exposing agents
to the industry risk, it reduces their incentive to take on industry risk. Second, it oﬀsets
agents’ idiosyncratic risk exposure. The condition in Corollary 1 shows which of these forces
prevails in equilibrium. For example, when principals are risk averse and average return to
eﬀort and/or industry risk is high, the optimal contracts puts a positive weight on APE (ie.,
m > 0) so that agents would internalise their tendency to take on too much industry risk.
By contrast, when principals are close to risk-neutral and average return to eﬀort and/or
industry risk is low, the optimal contract puts a negative weight on APE (ie., m < 0) to
reduce the agents’ idiosyncratic risk exposure.
14In the standard relative performance model principal observes two signals: a noisy signal of the agent’s
performance and a second signal that is uninformative about the agent’s performance but correlated with
the noise term of the ﬁrst signal. The second signal could be the performance of other agents working on the
project but could also be any other information correlated with the signal about the agent’s performance.
When the two signals are positively correlated, the second signal gets a negative weight. This is because
when the second signal is higher, the principal learns that the noise in the ﬁrst signal is likely to be high.
Putting a negative weight on the second signal, allows the principal not to reward the agent for luck.
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This ﬁnding regarding the purposes of APE versus RPE in compensation contracts oﬀers
a unique explanation to various empirical puzzles. For example, the empirical phenomenon
of “paying for luck” might be due to the fact that principals want to control agents’ excessive
risk-taking tendency. This empirical fact is established by running regression of executive
pay on industry benchmarks. However, as we show, there might be a large amount of RPE in
the compensation contracts (high l) even when the pay is positively correlated with industry
risk (high m). This simple regression only reﬂects the net eﬀect of APE and RPE and is no
longer suﬃcient. Our model shows that principals’ usage of APE and RPE is more complex
in the presence of both industry and idiosyncratic risks and a careful decomposition of the
pay package to undercover this underlaying cause of a particular mix of APE and RPE
instruments is needed instead. Furthermore, based on Corollary 1, our model predicts the
“pay for luck” phenomenon occurs more often in industries with volatile and high expected
productivity, while in industries where expected productivity is low, and ﬁrm-speciﬁc risks
are larger, our model ﬁnds that the sensitivity to industry risks is much lower, even turns
negative, predicting an asymmetry in “paying for luck.” These are new testable implications.
Next we turn to the comparison of the the decentralised equilibrium and the planner’s
solution in the baseline case.
Proposition 3: When τζ approaches inﬁnity, the eﬀort choices and contracts coincide in
equilibrium and in the planner’s solution.
In other words, if the industry productivity shock is perfectly revealed, principals are able
to completely counteract the impact of externalities among agents’ eﬀort-taking through
optimal contracting. To see this algebraically, let τζ go to inﬁnity, set ai = li + mi and
ci = lie¯. Substituting these in (12) we can restate principal i’s problem as choosing (ai, ci)
to maximize:
h¯ei − 1
2
rs
(
(ei − aiei + ci)2 1
τh
+ (1− ai)2 1
τ
)
− C (ei)− 1
2
r
(
(aiei − ci)2 1
τh
+ a2i
1
τ
)
− I¯
where agent i’s eﬀort is given by
ei =
aih¯+
r
τh
aici
1 + r
τh
a2i
Note that stated this way principals’ problems are completely separated and e¯ no longer
plays a role. This is because principal i can completely eliminate the impact of the industry
average eﬀort e¯ by adjusting ci. By redeﬁning the principals’ optimization problem this
way, we see that it coincides with the planner’s problem and Proposition 3 is obvious.
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Intuitively, when information friction on industry risk is absent, principals can use the two
contractual instruments – APE and RPE – to ﬁne tune their agents’ exposures to the two
types of risks – industry and idiosyncratic – and undo the welfare eﬀect of the contractual
externality regardless of the industry average eﬀort. The planner, therefore, has no role to
play in this environment. Here we observe a parallel between the workings of contractual and
pecuniary externalities. In general, pecuniary externality also does not have welfare changing
eﬀects except for conditions as established in Stiglitz (1982), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986),
Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1985), Arnott, Greenwald and Stiglitz (1994), and more
recently Farhi and Werning (2013).15
In the following two sections, we extend the baseline model to 0 ≤ τζ < ∞. In these
cases principals receive noisy and correlated signals about absolute performances, and have to
rely more on relative performance information. We illustrate how the resulting information
friction restricts the principals’ ability to separate the two types of risks, shapes the contracts
and generates welfare changing eﬀects.
6 Information Friction
Often major technological innovations make it extremely diﬃcult to assess the produc-
tivity of an industry but it is still possible to evaluate an agent’s performance relative to his
peers. To capture this feature in the simplest way, we begin our analysis by allowing the
industry-wide noise on APE to be extremely volatile, that is, by letting τζ be zero.
16
15There is an explosion of the literature on the welfare eﬀect of pecuniary externalities due to the growing
interests in studying social ineﬃciency of booms-busts. This includes but not limited to the following:
Krishnamurthy (2003); Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001; 2003); Gromb and Vayanos (2002); Korinek
(2010); Bianchi (2010); Bianchi and Mendoza, (2011); Stein (2012); Gersbach and Rochet (2012); He and
Kondor (2013); Farhi and Werning (2013). Davila (2011) and Stavrakeva (2013) have nice summaries of this
literature. Similar to pecuniary externalities, we show later that, with frictions, contractual externalities
might have welfare changing eﬀects.
16Intuitively, when there is a great uncertainty about the industry productivity, it is relatively easy to
assess an agent’s performance relative to his peers. That is, the information on the ranking of agents is
more precise than the information on an agent’s absolute performance level. Empirically, we observe that
stock analysts are better at ranking stocks than pricing stocks (Da and Schaumburg (2011)). The ﬁnance
literature is more successful in explaining cross-sectional equity returns while the equity premium remains
a puzzle. Moreover, this information structure parsimoniously captures the tournament-like incentives that
agents face in the real world. For example, the ranking of businesses, university programs, fund managers,
doctors in diﬀerent specialities, and even economists of diﬀerent vintages, is prevalent when there is also
(possibly quite noisy) information on their individual performance.
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In this limiting case, principals do not have any information about h˜ directly, and both
signals si and t are uninformative by themselves. However, their diﬀerence pi is informative
because it is unaﬀected by the common noise ζ˜. Consequently, principals can only assess
how much better or worse their agents are performing relative to the average and have to
base agents’ compensation on this information alone. As a result, m∗i = 0, that is, contracts
do not include an absolute performance-based pay component. In section 7, we relax this
assumption and study the intermediate case of 0 < τζ < ∞.
To solve her problem, principal i takes e¯ as given and chooses the optimal linear contract
which we denote by l∗i . The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium contract and
eﬀort levels.
Proposition 4: When τζ = 0, under the conditions in Proposition 1, a unique symmetric
equilibrium contract exists and satisﬁes
h¯2
r
τh
(l∗)2 + 1
(1− l∗)
(
1− rs
τh
l∗
)
− 1
τ
(rl∗ − rs (1− l∗)) = 0. (18)
Moreover, l∗ ∈ (0, 1) and the equilibrium eﬀort level is e∗ = e¯ = l∗h¯.
6.1 Equilibrium Properties
The expositional clarity of the equilibrium RPE (l∗) in (18) allows us to explore further
properties of contracts in this economy. To illustrate, we dissect the equilibrium condition
(18) into terms that reﬂect the tradeoﬀ between incentives and risk-sharing. To do so we
deﬁne the incentive provision as the level of compensation when the sole purpose of the
contract is to incentivise the agents to exert eﬀort, and the risk-sharing provision as the
level of compensation when the purpose of the contract is to allow risk sharing between
principals and agents. The following corollary characterizes the optimal contract in two
limiting cases.
Corollary 2: When τ goes to inﬁnity, the optimal linear contract reﬂects only the
incentive provision and is given by l∗i = min{1, τh/rs}. When τ goes to zero, the optimal
linear contract reﬂects only the risk-sharing provision and is given by l∗i = rs/(rs + r).
Corollary 2 allows us to identify the terms in the equilibrium condition (18) that corre-
spond to incentive and risk sharing provisions:
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h¯2
1
r
τh
(l∗i )
2 + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost of Unilateral Deviations
in Incentive Provision
(1− l∗i )
(
1− rs
τh
l∗i
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Incentive Provision
− 1
τ
(rl∗i − rs (1− l∗i ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Risk-Sharing Provision
= 0. (19)
The magnitude of risk-sharing provision is standard and depends on the relative risk-
aversions of principals and agents, rs/(rs + r). The magnitude of the incentive provision
has aspects unique to our model. In the standard moral hazard framework the magnitude
of incentive provision is simply 1. This is because when there is no risk sharing concern,
it is optimal to “sell the project” to the agent. A key insight of our model is that this
intuition does not hold when there is endogenous risk creation by the agents and this risk
is borne disproportionately by the principals. In fact, in our model, principals shoulder
all industry risk in equilibrium and the amount of industry risk depends on agents’ eﬀort
choices.17 Principals take account of the endogenous industry risk and their appetite for it
and set l∗i = min{1, τh/rs} when there is no risk sharing concern. Thus, the magnitude of
incentive provision is less than 1 when industry productivity is volatile or principals are risk
averse enough.
The weights that the incentive and the risk-sharing concerns receive in the equilibrium
contract are given by their coeﬃcients in (19). The ratio of these two coeﬃcents captures
the relative importance of the two concerns.
The decomposition in (19) shows that industry and idiosyncratic risks aﬀect the relative
importance of incentive provision through diﬀerent channels. Because idiosyncratic risks are
shared, when 1/τ goes up, the importance of incentive provision relative to risk sharing
declines. The impact of industry risk is more subtle. It aﬀects the relative importance
of incentive provision through the term (r(l∗i )
2/τh + 1).
18 This term is aﬀected by agent
i’s risk aversion and captures his disutility from taking on additional industry risk when
incentivised to work (potentially) more than the industry average.19 Note that this cost is
not incurred by agents in equilibrium. Nevertheless it plays a role in the determination of
the equilibrium contract. This is because a principal, considering unilateral deviation from
17To see why this is this case, recall in equilibrium e∗i = e¯. This implies that each agent’s industry risk
exposure in his compensation contract is zero in equilibrium (from (9)).
18This term appears in (10) when we solve agent i’s optimal eﬀort (except that here m = 0).
19Of course, in equilibrium, agent i’s industry risk exposure in his compensation contract is zero since agent
i hedges industry risk by choosing e∗i = e¯. Since each principal takes other principals and agents behaviours
as given, in her view, deviating from equilibrium choice and providing stronger incentives unilaterally would
impose her agent to bear more risk and hence result in this additional cost of incentive provision.
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equilibrium, would take this cost into account.
Next we highlight comparative statics that are unique to our model with potentially new
empirical implications.20 In the standard moral hazard framework, the power of contracts
increases in the marginal productivity of eﬀort h¯ and the precision of idiosyncratic risk τ.
As the next proposition shows, in our model, this is not necessarily the case.
Proposition 5: If τh/rs < (>,=) rs/(rs+ r), l
∗ decreases (increases, is constant) in h¯ and
τ.
To understand this proposition ﬁrst note that the importance of incentive provision rel-
ative to risk sharing is increasing in h¯ and τ. In the standard moral hazard framework, the
magnitude of incentive provision is 1 and it always exceeds the magnitude of risk sharing
provision rs/(rs + r). Hence, when the relative importance of incentive provision increases,
the power of the contract also increases. In contrast, in our model, as we explained above
due to endogenous risk taking, it is possible to have the magnitude of incentive provision
smaller than that of risk sharing provision. In this case, when the relative importance of
incentive provision increases, the power of the contract decreases.
Comparative statics of the equilibrium contract l∗ with respect to the principals’ and
the agents’ risk aversion parameters, rs and r, also provide new empirical implications. In
the standard moral hazard setting, as the principal becomes more or the agent becomes less
risk averse, l∗ increases to provide better risk-sharing. The next two propositions illustrate
that in the present setting there are opposing eﬀects which can dominate the direct eﬀect of
improved risk sharing.
Proposition 6: If h¯ or τ are large enough, l
∗ decreases in rs.
Since the principal needs to shoulder the entire industry risk, as she becomes more risk
averse, importance of incentive provision goes down as the importance of risk sharing goes
up. Proposition 6 shows that when h¯ or τ are large, this eﬀect dominates the direct eﬀect,
and l∗ decreases in rs.
Proposition 7: If τh/rs < rs/(rs + r) and h¯ or τ are large enough, l
∗ increases in r.
20To test these implications, it is possible to obtain empirical proxies for the model parameters such
as industry (marginal) productivity, industry risks and idiosyncratic risks, as well as risk aversions of the
principals and agents. For example, one can use the proportion of institutional investors in the shareholder
base of a ﬁrm as a proxy for (the inverse of) risk aversion of the ﬁrm.
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The intuition for Proposition 7 is more subtle. Suppose magnitude of risk sharing provi-
sion is larger than incentive provision, i.e., τh/rs < rs/(rs+r). As r increases, the importance
of risk-sharing relative to incentive provision goes up, and the power of the contract increases.
Proposition 7 shows that when h¯ or τ are large, this eﬀect dominates the direct eﬀect and
l∗ increases in r.
6.2 Comparison with the Second Best
Next, for the case τζ = 0, we compare the equilibrium eﬀorts and contracts with their
second-best levels. Recall that second-best solves the problem of the planner who internalizes
the impact of the contracts on the industry average eﬀort level e¯. As we discussed in Section
4.3, the planner’s problem can be viewed as maximizing the objective function given in (13)
subject to agents’ eﬀort choices given in (14). Since, when τζ = 0, the planner optimally sets
m = 0, from (14) we obtain e = lh¯. Plugging this into (13), the planner’s problem becomes
max
l≥0
[
−1
2
h¯2l
(
l
(
1 +
(
rs
τh
))
− 2
)
− 1
2
l2
r
τ
− 1
2
(1− l)2 rs
τ
]
. (20)
The ﬁrst-order condition of the problem is
h¯2
(
1− lSB
(
rs
τh
+ 1
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Incentive Provision
− 1
τ
(
rlSB − rs
(
1− lSB))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Risk-Sharing Provision
= 0, (21)
and the solution to the planner’s problem is:
lSB =
rs
τ
+ h¯2
r
τ
+ rs
τ
+ h¯2
(
rs
τh
+ 1
) . (22)
Like the optimal equilibrium contract, the second-best solution also reﬂects the incentive
and risk-sharing provisions. The following corollary summarizes the limiting results for the
second-best contract.
Corollary 3: When τ goes to inﬁnity, the second-best contract reﬂects only incentive
provision and is given by lSB = 1/(rs/τh+1). When τ goes to zero, the second-best contract
reﬂects only risk-sharing provision and is given by lSB = rs/(rs + r).
Although the second-best solution of (21) is similar to the equilibrium solution of (19)
in reﬂecting both incentive and risk-sharing provisions, there are two important diﬀerences.
First, the second best requires a lower magnitude of incentive provision than in equilibrium.21
21Since 1/(rs/τh + 1) < min{1, τh/rs}.
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Second, there is no cost of unilateral deviations in incentive provision. That is, contractual
externality has two opposing eﬀects. Intuitively, the ﬁrst eﬀect arises because principals
do not take into account the industry risk exposure of other principals in the industry.
When principals are risk averse, they have to trade oﬀ incentivising their agents to work
harder versus exposing themselves to more industry risks in their projects. Stronger the
incentive they choose, higher the output they would expect, and larger the industry risk
they are exposed. Their industry risk exposure is endogenously linked to the strength of the
incentives they provide. When setting incentives, a principal optimally chooses her own risk-
return tradeoﬀ ignoring her impact on increasing other principals’ industry risk exposure. In
the second best, a planner sets incentives by taking into account the feedback loop between
industry average and individual eﬀort choices and consequences of industry risk exposure for
other principals in the industry. This means, the second best requires weaker incentives for
agents.
The second eﬀect goes in the opposite direction and arises because each principal perceives
a unilateral deviation from the industry average as being too costly. Recall, the cost of
unilateral deviations in incentive provision is incurred in equilibrium when a principal, who
takes the industry average eﬀort e¯ as given, considers increasing incentives and making her
agent work harder unilaterally. The principal realizes that by doing so, her agent’s eﬀort
would be above e¯ which imposes costly industry risk on the agent, and she has to compensate
the agent for this risk. In the second best, this unilateral deviation cost disappears because
planner can coordinate (dictate) incentive provision across all principals in the industry.
Therefore, the relative importance of incentive provision is higher in second best.
To summarise, the externality in the model has two opposing eﬀects on the performance-
pay sensitivity in the contract. Compared with the second best, the magnitude of equilibrium
incentive provision is larger because principals do not internalise the impact of their incen-
tive provision on the average eﬀort level and the industry risk exposure of other principals,
consequently, provide too much incentive. However, the relative importance of equilibrium
incentive provision is lower because principals perceive unilateral increases in incentive provi-
sion as too costly. The next proposition characterises which eﬀect dominates and whether the
equilibrium contract is more or less sensitive to performance than the second-best contract.
Proposition 8: The equilibrium contract is more (less, equally) sensitive to performance
than the second-best contract (ie, lSB is smaller than (greater than, equal to) l∗), and
consequently agents put more (less, equal) eﬀort in equilibrium than the second best, (ie,
eSB is less than (greater than, equal to) e∗) if (17) is positive (negative, zero).
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Comparing Proposition 8 and Corollary 1 we immediately obtain the following result
linking the usage and the sign of APE in the baseline model with the direction of ineﬃciencies
that result from basing contracts on RPE alone.
Corollary 4: When τζ = 0 and contracts are based solely on RPE, the equilibrium
contract is more (less, equally) sensitive to performance than the second-best contract if and
only if without any informational friction (ie., when τζ = ∞), the weight on the absolute
performance signal m∗, is positive (negative, zero).
Corollary 4 gives a diﬀerent perspective on the results of excessive/insuﬃcient risk taking
with only RPE. As we discussed in Section 5, principals would like to use positive APE, ie,
set m > 0, in order to incentivise their agents while letting them internalise the industry risk
they are generating. However, when principals are constrained from using APE, they end up
relying more on RPE, ie, set a larger l, triggering feedback loops between the industry average
and agents’ eﬀort choices, causing excessive eﬀort provision and risk taking in equilibrium
relative to the second best. Similarly, when principals are constrained from using negative
APE to control eﬀort, the opposite happens. They lower RPE instead, triggering a race to
the bottom, resulting in insuﬃcient equilibrium eﬀort and risk-taking relative to the second
best.
The above proposition shows a pro-cyclical pattern of incentive provision, eﬀort choice
and risk-taking in the economy. To see this, note that (17) is positive for a suﬃciently large
h¯ if principals are risk-averse. When h¯ is large, the incentive provision term gets a larger
weight in equilibrium than in the second-best (shown as the coeﬃcient in front of the incentive
concern term in equations (19) and (21)). This means that when h¯ is large, ie, during the
productivity boom, the contracting between principals and agents is more motivated by the
incentive concern. During this time, the expected productivity of eﬀort is very high, and
principals would like to oﬀer their own agents a contract with a high performance sensitivity.
By doing so, they do not internalise the impact of their own incentive-provision on increasing
the industry average eﬀort, and trigger a rat race. Since marginal productivity of eﬀort is
random in our model, an immediate consequence of this result is that there is excess risk-
taking behaviour among agents in equilibrium. The planner, in this case, can improve the
total welfare by enforcing lower performance-based pay sensitivities in agents’ compensation
contracts.
By contrast, when h¯ is low, eg., during downturns, (17) is negative. In this case, since
the expected productivity of eﬀort is low, the incentive provision term gets a lower weight in
equilibrium than in the second-best. The cost of providing incentives unilaterally becomes
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a major consideration for principals. Principals would like to free-ride on each other in
incentive provision, oﬀering their agents a contract with a low performance-pay sensitivity.
By doing so, principals again do not internalise the impact of their own incentive-provision
on increasing the industry average eﬀort, and hence under-incentivise the agents relative to
the second-best. This again triggers a race but this time causes a race to the bottom. There
is insuﬃcient eﬀort- and risk-taking. In this case, the planner can improve the total welfare
by enforcing contracts with higher performance based pay-sensitivities.
6.3 Industry-wide vs. Idiosyncratic Variations in Productivity
In this section, we show that the excessive (insuﬃcient) eﬀort provision is related to the
common/systemic rather than project-speciﬁc/idiosyncratic risk. To highlight the source of
externality we consider the case where the productivity shock is idiosyncratic rather than
common to the industry. Speciﬁcally, we let Vi = k˜iei + ˜i where k˜i is a project-speciﬁc
random term which is independently and normally distributed across agents with mean k
and variance 1/τk.
As before, we assume that the two contractible signals are
si = k˜iei + ˜i + ζ˜ ,
and
t = ke¯+ ζ˜ ,
where e¯ is the average eﬀort exerted by the agents in the industry. Clearly this is equivalent
to simply observing pi = k˜iei − ke¯+ ˜i.
We can now write agent i’s compensation when absolute performance signals are not
contractible (eg., τζ = 0) as
Ii = lipi +Wi = li
(
k˜iei − ke¯+ ˜i
)
+Wi. (23)
Using (23), given a contract (li,Wi) and average eﬀort e¯, agent i chooses ei to maximize
E (u (Ii − C (ei))) .
Plugging in pi and computing the expectation in the above equation, the agent’s problem
can be restated as choosing ei to maximize
likei − like¯+Wi − C (ei)− 1
2
r
(
(liei)
2 1
τk
+ l2i
1
τ
)
.
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Taking the ﬁrst-order condition and solving for ei, we obtain agent i’s eﬀort choice as
ei =
lik¯
1 + r
τk
l2i
. (24)
The above equation shows that, as one would expect, a volatile project-speciﬁc risk (1/τk)
lowers the eﬀort level. More importantly, it shows that when the productivity shock is id-
iosyncratic, there are no feedback loop between the industry average eﬀort and an individual
agent’s eﬀort. Therefore, the results we obtained earlier on excessive (insuﬃcient) eﬀort
provision can only arise in an environment where the productivity shock has a systematic
component across projects in the industry.
7 Intermediate Cases of Information Friction
In the previous two sections, we derive closed-form solutions and explore the properties
of the model with either no information frictions or with severe information frictions when
only RPE is informative. These cases correspond to τζ equal to inﬁnity or zero. In this
section, we look at the intermediate cases where 0 < τζ < ∞, that is, principals receive an
informative but imperfect signal about absolute performances.
In these cases, the information friction does not eliminate, but nevertheless restricts prin-
cipals’ ability to use APE in contracts, causing externalities to prevail. Since, a closed form
solution is not possible, we provide two numerical examples, showing how the equilibrium
and the second best incentives change with information friction, τζ . One example is a case
when contractual externalities cause excessive eﬀort/risk taking relative to the second best;
and the other is the opposite. In both examples, when τζ increases, the impact of the en-
dogenous contractual externality becomes smaller as principals’ ability to span the risk space
of the agents strengthens. Therefore, our numerical analysis indicates that when the noise
ζ˜ becomes more precise, the impact of the externality weakens and the gap between the
equilibrium and the second best narrows.
The graphs in Figure 1 illustrate the intuition in the case where equilibrium eﬀort level
exceeds the second best. In this case, (17) is positive indicating that, without information
friction, principals would like to use positive APE (m∗ > 0). As this noise becomes smaller
(ie., τζ gets larger), the information friction on using APE is less constraining, principals
increase the equilibrium sensitivity to APE (m∗) to give agents a positive exposure to the
industry risk and better control agents’ excessive correlated risk-taking. This is shown in
Figure 1(d). Correspondingly, this switch to the usage of APE in contracts leads to the
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Figure 1: Noisy Industry Signal (τζ) and Excessive Eﬀort: The solid and the long-dashed lines represent
how the total performance sensitivity a, relative performance l, absolute performance m, and eﬀort (e)
change with respect to the noise of the average industry performance signal (τζ) in equilibrium and in the
planner’s optimum, respectively. The parameters are ﬁxed at r = 0.3, rs = 0.16, τ = 1, h¯ = 0.6, and
τh = 0.05.
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Figure 2: Noisy Industry Signal (τζ) and Insuﬃcient Eﬀort: The solid and the long-dashed lines represent
how the total performance sensitivity l, relative performance l, absolute performancem, and eﬀort (e) change
with respect to the noise of the average industry performance signal (τζ) in equilibrium and in the planner’s
optimum, respectively. The parameters are ﬁxed at r = 0.3, rs = 0.01, τ = 1, h¯ = 0.6, and τh = 0.05.
sensitivity to relative performance (l∗) to drop in equilibrium, as shown in Figure 1(c).
However, the total performance sensitivity in the equilibrium contract (a∗ = l∗+m∗) increases
since principals are able to use both contractual instruments, APE and RPE, more eﬀectively
as τζ increases. Interestingly, agents reduce eﬀort in equilibrium because they are now
exposed to the industry risk through absolute performance pay, as shown in Figure 1(b).
Further, as expected, when τζ gets larger, the information friction gets smaller, the impact
of the externality weakens, the gap between the equilibrium and the second best narrows.
The graphs in Figure 2 illustrate the intuition in the case where equilibrium eﬀort level
falls below the second best. In this case, (17) is negative indicating that, without information
friction, principals would like to use negative APE (m∗ < 0). This happens when principals
are less risk-averse and/or idiosyncratic risks are relatively larger than the industry risks. In
these occasions, principals would not mind taking over a large portion of idiosyncratic risks
from their agents to lower contracting costs, which implies negative absolute performance
pay sensitivity. The noise in the industry output signal, ζ˜, constrains principals’ ability to
do so. When τζ gets larger, this constraint gets less binding, which explains the increased use
of APE (that is, the contract is more negatively related to absolute performance) in Figure
2(d). This in turns makes it less costly for principals to use RPE since agents bear less ﬁrm-
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speciﬁc risks, resulting in higher usage of relative performance pay as in Figure 2(c). The
total performance sensitivity in the equilibrium contract (a∗), just as in the previous case,
also increases in τζ . Again when the noise in absolute performance signals becomes smaller,
principals are less constrained to use both contractual instruments, APE and RPE, to span
the risk space agents are facing, as shown in Figure 2(a). Interestingly, agents increase
their eﬀort in equilibrium because they are less exposed to the idiosyncratic risk through
the lowered absolute performance sensitivity and more incentivized to take on correlated
industry risk through increased relative performance sensitivity, which is shown in Figure
2(b). Further, as expected, when τζ gets larger, the information friction gets smaller, the
impact of the externality weakens, the gap between the equilibrium and the second best
narrows. These numerical examples show that the insights of the models are robust and
endogenous contractual externalities exist when there exists some form of the information
friction in the contracting environment.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we study how information frictions in contracting leads to pro-cyclical
and potentially excessive risk-taking in the economy. In our model, principals set contracts
to make individually optimal risk-return trade-oﬀs ignoring their impact on contracting
benchmarks such as average eﬀort in the industry. This results in contractual externalities.
In our baseline model, absolute performance signals do not have any correlated noise and
contracts are based on both APE and RPE. We show that by shielding agents from it,
RPE encourages agents to take industry risk which the principals must shoulder. Despite
this, principals use the two contractual instruments to tailor their agents’ exposures to the
industry and idiosyncratic risks and eliminate the welfare impact of contractual externalities.
However, in presence of information frictions contractual externalities have welfare chang-
ing eﬀects. For example, when there is a high level of uncertainty about industry produc-
tivity, relative performance information is likely to be more precise and principals lean on
RPE in contracting. Overreliance on RPE may set oﬀ the ratchet eﬀect in eﬀort choices
among agents. For example, risk-averse principals are eager to provide more powerful in-
centives during booms, causing the industry average eﬀort to be high, triggering a rat race
among agents to exert excessive eﬀort, which results in excessive systemic risk exposure in
the economy, relative to the second-best. During recessions, the opposite might happen: The
incentive provision is too weak and the equilibrium level of eﬀort is lower than the second
best.
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Besides theoretical contributions, our results oﬀer a novel explanation, based on frictions
in managerial compensation, to the boom-bust cycle of investment and risk-taking observed
in industries that experience new but uncertain productivity shocks. These episodes are
abundant in recent years. For example, following the introduction of the Internet, the
dot.com industry has been ﬂooded with investment which is subsequently reduced. Simi-
larly, following the innovations in the ﬁnancial products such as asset-based securities, the
ﬁnancial industry has expanded signiﬁcantly followed by a sharp contraction. Compensa-
tion regulations such as enforcing counter-cyclical performance pay could improve the total
welfare.
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Appendix
In the proof we drop the subscript i when there is no room for confusion and we use the
following notation:
t =
r
τh
, v =
r
τ
, u =
r
τζ
, p =
rs
τh
, q =
rs
τ
, s =
rs
τζ
.
Proof of Proposition 1
Note that
ei =
(li +mi) h¯+ tli (li +mi) e¯
1 + t (li +mi)
2 = (li +mi) h¯+ o (1/τh) .
Let ai = li +mi. Substituting this into (12) we obtain:
max
ai,bi
ai
(
h¯
)2 − (aih¯)2
2
− 1
2
(
a2i v +m
2
iu
)− 1
2
(
(1− ai)2 q +m2i s
)
+ o (1/τh)− I¯ .
For suﬃciently large τh this function is concave in (ai,mi) and has a unique maximum
(a∗,m∗) which is identical for all principals. From this we solve for the unique l∗ = a∗−m∗.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Let a = l +m. The principals’ objective can be written as
h¯e− 1
2
e2 − 1
2
(
(ae− le¯)2 t+ a2v)− 1
2
(
((1− a) e+ le¯)2 p+ (1− a)2 q) . (25)
and the ﬁrst order condition yields the optimal level of eﬀort as a function of contract terms
and the average eﬀort
e =
ah¯+ tlae¯
1 + ta2
.
Next substituting for the eﬀort level in the objective function of (25) we obtain(
h¯
(
ah¯+ tlae¯
1 + ta2
)
− 1
2
(
ah¯+ tlae¯
1 + ta2
)2
− 1
2
((
a
(
ah¯+ tlae¯
1 + ta2
)
− le¯
)2
t+ a2v
))
(26)
−1
2
((
(1− a)
(
ah¯+ tlae¯
1 + ta2
)
+ le¯
)2
p+ (1− a)2 q
)
.
For a given a the above function is negative quadratic in l. Thus for a given a principals’
objective function is maximized at l (a) which is given by
l (a) =
h¯a (t (ta2 + 1)− p (1− a) (ta+ 1))
e¯
(
t (ta2 + 1) + p (ta+ 1)2
) . (27)
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Substituting (27) for l (a) in (26) we reduce principals’ problem to choosing a to maximize
1
2
h¯2a (t+ p)
a (t− 1) + 2
t+ p+ t2a2 + pt2a2 + 2pta
− 1
2
a2v − 1
2
(1− a)2 q.
Taking the derivative with respect to a, we obtain
−h¯2 (ta+ 1) (t+ p)2 (a− 1)
(t+ p+ t2a2 + pt2a2 + 2pta)2
− av − (a− 1) q.
Note that the above function starts as positive and crosses to negative once. Thus the
objective function is maximized at a∗ that solves
H (a) = −h¯2 (ta+ 1) (t+ p)2 (a− 1)−(t+ p+ t2a2 (p+ 1) + 2pta)2 (av + (a− 1) q) = 0.
Note that a∗ ∈ (0, 1). In equilibrium
e¯ =
a∗h¯+ ta∗l (a∗) e¯
1 + t (a∗)2
.
Plugging for l (a∗), we obtain
e¯ =
h¯a∗ (ta∗ + 1) (t+ p)
t
(
t (a∗)2 + 1
)
+ p (ta∗ + 1)2
.
Using the above to substitute for e¯ in (27), we obtain
l (a∗) =
t
(
1 + t (a∗)2
)
+ p (a∗ − 1) (ta∗ + 1)
(ta∗ + 1) (t+ p)
.
Thus
m∗ = a∗ − l (a∗)
= a∗i −
r
τh
(
1 + r
τh
(a∗i )
2
)
+ rs
τh
(a∗i − 1)
(
r
τh
a∗i + 1
)
(
r
τh
a∗i + 1
)(
r
τh
+ rs
τh
) .
Proof of Corollary 1:
We continue to use the notation in the proof of Proposition 2. First, note that
m∗ = a∗ − l (a∗) > 0 ⇔ l (a∗) < a∗.
Using the expression for xa∗we see that
l (a∗) < a∗ ⇔ p (1 + ta∗) > t (1− a∗) ,
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or if and only if
a∗ >
(
t− p
t (1 + p)
)
.
Note
H
(
t− p
t (1 + p)
)
=
1
t
1
(p+ 1)3
(t+ p)2 (t+ 1)2
(
pv − tv + h¯2p2 + h¯2p+ pq + pqt) .
Thus l (a∗) ≤ a∗ if and only if(
h¯2
rs
τh
(
rs
τh
+ 1
)
+
rs
τ
rs
τh
(
r
τh
+ 1
))
≥ r
τ
(
r
τh
− rs
τh
)
which is equivalent to (17).
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof is given in the text following the statement of Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 4
From Proposition 1, we know the existence part holds.
We use (10) to plug in for e in the principals’ problem (12) (where m is set to zero given
that the signal t is uninformative) and take the derivative of the objective function with
respect to l to ﬁnd the ﬁrst-order condition as a function of e¯.
In equilibrium, e¯ = lh¯. Therefore any equilibrium must solve for the ﬁrst-order condition
and e¯ = lh¯. To ﬁnd an equilibrium we plug e¯ = lh¯ in the ﬁrst order condition. After
simplifying we ﬁnd the equilibrium condition:
h¯2
(l − 1) (lp− 1)
tl2 + 1
− (vl − q (1− l)) = 0.
The next lemma is useful in proving the comparative statics results:
Lemma 1: Let
Ψ (l) = h¯2
(l − 1) (lp− 1)
tl2 + 1
. (28)
Suppose there is a unique equilibrium, then the following are true. (i) Ψ (l)− (vl − q (1− l))
crosses zero from above at l∗ where Ψ is given in (28). (ii) If 1/p > q/ (v + q) then l∗ < 1/p,
otherwise l∗ > 1/p.
Proof of Lemma 1
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Part (i) follows from Ψ (0) + q > 0, Ψ (1) − v < 0 and uniqueness. The proof of (ii)
is immediate if 1/p > 1. So suppose 1/p < 1. Otherwise, Ψ (l) crosses zero at 1/p < 1.
Ψ(l)− (vl − q (1− l)) is above Ψ (l) for l < q/ (v + q) and is below Ψ (l) for l > q/ (v + q).
This and the fact that there is a unique equilibrium l∗ prove part (ii).
Proof of Proposition 5
Equilibrium l∗ solves
Ψ (l∗)− (vl∗ − q (1− l∗)) = 0
where Ψ is given in (28). We write Ψ
(
l∗
(
h¯
)
, h¯
)
to make the dependence of Ψ and l∗ on h¯
explicit. We use similar notation for other parameters, eg, Ψ (l∗ (τh) , τh).
Taking the total derivative of the equilibrium condition with respect to h¯ we obtain
∂l∗
(
h¯
)
∂h¯
=
−∂Ψ
∂h¯
∂Ψ(l∗(h¯),h¯)
∂l
− (v + q)
.
Denominator is negative by Lemma 1 (i). By Lemma 1 (ii),
∂Ψ
(
l∗, h¯
)
∂h¯
= −2h¯(1− l
∗) (pl∗ − 1)
t (l∗)2 + 1
≷ 0
if 1/p ≷ q/ (v + q) which proves part (i) for h¯. Proof for the result on τ is entirely analogous.
Proof of Proposition 6
Taking the total derivative of the equilibrium condition with respect to rs, we obtain
∂l∗
∂rs
= −
∂Ψ
∂rs
+ 1
τ
(1− l∗)
∂Ψ
∂l
− (v + q)
Denominator is negative by Lemma 1 (i). Moreover,
∂Ψ
∂rs
+
1
τ
(1− l∗) = h¯2
(l − 1)
(
l
τh
)
tl2 + 1
+
1
τ
(1− l∗)
Hence ∂l
∗
∂rs
< 0 if
h¯2τ >
(
r
τh
(l∗)2 + 1
)
τh
l∗
(29)
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On the r.h.s. of (29) only l∗ depends on h¯ or τ. We know that l∗ takes a value between
rs
r+rs
and τh
rs
. Hence the r.h.s. is bounded in h¯ and τ. As a result (29) holds if h¯ or τ are
large.
Proof of Proposition 7
Taking the total derivative of the equilibrium condition with respect to r, we obtain:
∂l∗ (r)
∂r
=
−∂Ψ
∂r
+ 1
τ
l∗
∂Ψ
∂l
− (v + q) .
Denominator is negative by Lemma 1 (i). Thus ∂l
∗(r)
∂r
> 0 iﬀ
∂Ψ(l∗, r)
∂r
− 1
τ
l∗ = h¯2
(1− l∗) (pl∗ − 1)(
t (l∗)2 + 1
)2 (l∗)2τh − 1τ l∗ > 0.
From Lemma 1 (ii), 1/p < q/ (v + q) implies l∗ > 1/p. Hence, the above inequality holds iﬀ
h¯2τ >
(
r
τh
(l∗)2 + 1
)2
τh
(1− l∗)
(
rs
τh
l∗ − 1
)
l∗
. (30)
On the r.h.s. of (30) only l∗ depends on h¯ or τ and τhrs ≤ l∗ ≤ rsr+rs . Hence the r.h.s. is
bounded in h¯ and τ. As a result (30) holds if h¯ or τ are large.
Proof of Proposition 8
Proof follows from plugging lSB in the equilibrium condition (18) and checking whether
its value is positive (in which case lSB < l∗) or negative (in which case lSB > l∗).
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